Beschreibung
Following the recent efforts to study EU lobbying in comparative perspective, this work examines EU lobbying in comparison to the US as both systems share similar federal arrangements and multi-level governance. The paper analyzes the impact of the institutional setting on lobbying, the type of the interest representation and the lobbying legislation of the EU from the point of comparison, identifying obvious similarities along with differences and clarifying some points as well as contributing to the EU comparative studies. Along with the similarities, the paper identifies a noticeable difference between these two systems: while the US has well-regulated lobbying legislation, the EU has so far regulated this industry by the non-compulsory Code of Conduct, which does not guarantee the transparency of the lobbying practices. While the work names the probable drawbacks that transparent lobbying legislation might bring for the EU including the threat to efficiency and effectiveness of the system, it stresses the need for robust legislation in order the EU to achieve the same standards that exist in the US.
Autorenporträt
Nato Kurshitashvili is working as a professional expert at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, Switzerland. She holds a Masters Degree from the Department of Public Policy of the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
