Beschreibung
Revision with unchanged content. In philosophy of mind, mind-body or "substance" dualism holds that the mind is a real, non-material entity distinct from the brain. Though this position was once the standard view of most Western thinkers, it is now often regarded as thoroughly discredited. This book seeks to identify the major arguments that have been raised to refute substance dualism and in turn offers a robust defence of dualism as the most plausible model of the mind-brain relationship as well as some replies to the opposing arguments. The author maintains that perspectives as diverse as epistemology, phenomenology and even evolutionary biology converge in support of substance dualism and that it is the view most compatible with the ethical and anthropological claims of Christian theology. This work will be of interest to those working in philosophy of mind, psychology and neuroscience as well as to scholars of theology and religion.
Autorenporträt
is Director of the Newman Centre atMcGill University (Montreal, Canada).He has done postgraduate work atthe Pontifical Lateran University (Rome),Concordia University (Montreal) and McGill.
