Foundations in Microeconomic Theory

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160,49 

A Volume in Honor of Hugo F Sonnenschein

ISBN: 3540740562
ISBN 13: 9783540740568
Herausgeber: Matthew O Jackson/Andrew McLennan
Verlag: Springer Verlag GmbH
Umfang: vii, 541 S.
Erscheinungsdatum: 14.02.2008
Auflage: 1/2008
Produktform: Gebunden/Hardback
Einband: GEB

Presents some of the most important articles in microeconomic theory of the last few decadesProvides insights into the genesis of scientific papers: Introductions to each chapter written by the authors outline how the work came to be written and which was Hugo Sonnenschein’s influence on the work

Artikelnummer: 1160688 Kategorie:

Beschreibung

InhaltsangabeAn Existence Theorem for the Second Best.- An Equilibrium Model with Involuntary Unemployment at Flexible, Competitive Prices and Wages.- Price Distortion and Potential Welfare.- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance.- Residential Land Use.- Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry.- Power, Majority Voting, and Linear Income Tax Schedules.- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium.- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information.- Finitely Repeated Games.- Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent Intertemporal Plans.- Strategy-Proof Exchange.- Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods.- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-up Problem.- The Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice Correspondences: A General Formulation and a Limit Result.- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games.- Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction.- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.- Player Type Distributions as State Variables and Information Revelation in Zero Sum Repeated Games with Discounting.- Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships.- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods.

Autorenporträt

InhaltsangabeAn Existence Theorem for the Second Best.- An Equilibrium Model with Involuntary Unemployment at Flexible, Competitive Prices and Wages.- Price Distortion and Potential Welfare.- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance.- Residential Land Use.- Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry.- Power, Majority Voting, and Linear Income Tax Schedules.- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium.- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information.- Finitely Repeated Games.- Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent Intertemporal Plans.- Strategy-Proof Exchange.- Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods.- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-up Problem.- The Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice Correspondences: A General Formulation and a Limit Result.- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games.- Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction.- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.- Player Type Distributions as State Variables and Information Revelation in Zero Sum Repeated Games with Discounting.- Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships.- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods.

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