Beschreibung
This book concentrates on public health insurance scope and impacts of various insurance regimes on accidents in Canada. It is shown that it may be optimal to provide full coverage for some, but no coverage at all for other conditions. An important implication of the result on the impact of horizontal equity on health-care coverage is that primary health care policies which deliver services, such as homecare, to sick people are likely to be highly efficient, particularly as compared to providing additional health care services to these individuals. On investigating how various insurance compensation systems can influence driving behaviors, the results indicate that no-fault rules have led to an increase in fatal accident compared to provinces with tort rules in place but with significant provincial differentiation. On the severity impacts, the results of the Ordered Probit Model on Saskatchewan drivers involved in accidents show that no-fault regime has been associated with shift in injuries from minor to more serious injuries and fatal accidents. However, the result on choice system does not provide any significant sign of decreasing the level of severity of accidents.
Autorenporträt
Dr. Reza Ghazal is currently an economist at IDB. He graduated from Ottawa University in 2009 with specialization in IO, Public Economics and Insurance Economics. Since then, he has been working as Professor at ECO College of Insurance, as economist at BearingPoint Consulting (formerly KPMG) and National Research Council of Canada (NRC).
