Beschreibung
Tacit collusion is a well-studied phenomenon accepted in competition law as an anomaly that only occurs under specific conditions. However, with the rise of artificial intelligence, it is more likely that pricing algorithms could develop the ability to collude in more instances and without human interference. While neither tacit collusion nor its algorithmically induced version constitutes a concerted practice, algorithmic tacit collusion is sufficiently different from a technical, economic, and policy perspective to warrant alternative legal treatment. Algorithmically induced tacit collusion in fact resembles a cartel in its effects and should, in principle, also be treated as such. In his comprehensive study, Adrian Doerr develops a new approach within the existing regulatory framework to keep algorithmic tacit collusion in check.
Autorenporträt
born in 1993; 2014 BScEcon (Hons) in Business and Management with Law, Aberystwyth University; 2016 MJur, Pembroke College, University of Oxford; research assistant at an international law firm; 2020 visiting researcher at Gonville & Caius College, University of Cambridge; 2020 Graduate Diploma in Law, BPP University Cambridge; 2021 LLM in Commercial Legal Practice, BPP University London; 2023 qualified Solicitor in England & Wales; 2024 PhD in Law from Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf.
Herstellerkennzeichnung:
Jana Trispel
Wilhelmstraße, 18
72074 Tübingen
DE
E-Mail: trispel@mohrsiebeck.com
