Beschreibung
Inhaltsangabeto the Series "Game Equilibrium Models".- to Volume IV: "Social and Political Interaction".- Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection.- Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?.- The Distributiun of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium.- Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach.- Altruism in Social Dilemmas - Failure to Catch It in a Parameter.- The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature.- Balance of Power in a Parlor Game.- Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach.- The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance - A Game Theoretic Analysis -.- Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist's Intentions.- Implicatidns of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part II: A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces.- Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information.
Autorenporträt
Inhaltsangabeto the Series "Game Equilibrium Models".- to Volume IV: "Social and Political Interaction".- Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection.- Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?.- The Distributiun of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium.- Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach.- Altruism in Social Dilemmas - Failure to Catch It in a Parameter.- The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature.- Balance of Power in a Parlor Game.- Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach.- The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance - A Game Theoretic Analysis -.- Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist's Intentions.- Implicatidns of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part II: A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces.- Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information.
