Beschreibung
This monograph provides a novel approach to epistemic responsibility assessment. The author presents unique arguments for the epistemic significance of belief-influencing actions and omissions. He grounds his proposal in indirect doxastic control. The book consists of two parts. The first part looks at the different ways in which an agent might control the revision, retention, or rejection of her beliefs. It provides a systematic overview of the different approaches to doxastic control. Coverage also includes a thorough study of reasons-responsive approaches to indirect doxastic control. In the second part, the author examines epistemic peer disagreement. He argues that the epistemic significance of this does not only rely on the way in which an agent should revise her belief in the face of disagreement. It also relies on the way in which an agent should act. This establishes the epistemic significance of belief-influencing actions and omissions under certain conditions. This book deals with questions of meliorative epistemology in general and with questions concerning doxastic responsibility and epistemic responsibility assessment in particular. It will appeal to graduate students and researchers with an interest in epistemology.
Autorenporträt
Andrea Robitzsch is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Osnabrück. She received her PhD from Ruhr University Bochum in 2016. Her research focusses on normative questions in epistemology, especially on questions concerning epistemic justification, epistemic norms, epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.